Re Barry George
80. One might have thought at first sight that, when applications for compensation were made to the Secretary of State, such simple wording could be applied to each case without much difficulty. But that has proved not to be the case, as can be seen from the speeches in R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 AC 1, where the meaning of the words “miscarriage of justice” was under scrutiny. Lord Bingham said that he would hesitate to accept the submission of the Secretary of State that section 133 obliged him to pay compensation only when a defendant, finally acquitted in the circumstances satisfying the statutory conditions, is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be innocent of the crime of which he had been convicted: para 9. Lord Steyn, on the other hand, said that the words “miscarriage of justice” extend only to cases where the person concerned is acknowledged to be clearly innocent: para 56.
A fresh analysis
96. If one accepts, as I would do, Lord Bingham’s reasons for doubting whether Lord Steyn was right to find support for his reading of article 14(6) in the French text and in para 25 of the explanatory committee’s report on article 3 of the Seventh Protocol, one is driven back to the language of the article itself as to what the words “miscarriage of justice” mean. Taken by itself this phrase can have a wide meaning. It is the sole ground on which convictions can be brought under review of the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 106(3). But the fact that these words are linked to what is shown “conclusively” by a new or newly discovered fact clearly excludes cases where there may have been a wrongful conviction and the court is persuaded on this ground only that it is unsafe. It clearly includes cases where the innocence of the defendant is clearly demonstrated. But the article does not state in terms that the only criterion is innocence. Indeed, the test of “innocence” had appeared in previous drafts but it was not adopted. I would hold, in agreement with Lord Phillips (see para 55 above) that it includes also cases where the new or newly discovered fact shows that the evidence against the defendant has been so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based upon it. In that situation it will have been shown conclusively that the defendant had no case to answer, so the prosecution should not have been brought in the first place
97. There is an important difference between these two categories. It is one thing to be able to assert that the defendant is clearly innocent. Cases of that kind
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have become more common and much more easily recognised since the introduction into the criminal courts, long after article 14(6) of the ICCPR was ratified in 1976, of DNA evidence. It seems unlikely that the possibility of demonstrating innocence in this way was contemplated when the test in article 14(6) was being formulated. Watson and Crick published their discovery of the double helix in 1951, but DNA profiling was not developed until 1984 and it was not until 1988 that it was used to convict Colin Pitchfork and to clear the prime suspect in the Enderby Murders case. The state should not, of course, subject those who are clearly innocent to punishment and it is clearly right that they should be compensated if it does so. But it is just as clear that it should not subject to the criminal process those against whom a prosecution would be bound to fail because the evidence was so undermined that no conviction could possibly be based upon it. If the new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that the case was of that kind, it would seem right in principle that compensation should be payable even though it is not possible to say that the defendant was clearly innocent. I do not think that the wording of article 14(6) excludes this, and it seems to me that its narrowly circumscribed language permits it.
98. The range of cases that will fall into the category that I have just described is limited by the requirement that directs attention only to the evidence which was the basis for the conviction and asks whether the new or newly discovered fact has completely undermined that evidence. It is limited also by the fact that the new or newly discovered fact must be the reason for reversing the conviction. This suggests that it must be the sole reason, but I do not see the fact that the appellate court may have given several reasons for reversing the conviction as presenting a difficulty. All the other reasons that it has given will have to be disregarded. The question will be whether the new or newly discovered fact, taken by itself, was enough to show conclusively that there was a miscarriage of justice because no conviction could possibly have been based on the evidence which was used to obtain it.
99. For these reasons it is plain that category 1 in Dyson LJ’s list (see para 83, above) falls within the scope of section 133. I think that it is equally plain that category 4 (Lord Bingham’s second limb) does not, as it is taken from para 4 of Lord Bingham’s speech in Mullen where he was discussing what was included within the phrase “wrongful convictions”, not what was meant by section 133. This leaves category 2, where the “fresh evidence” shows that the defendant was wrongly convicted in the sense that, had the fresh evidence been available, no reasonable jury could properly have convicted; and category 3, where the “fresh evidence” is such that the conviction cannot be regarded as safe, but the court cannot say that no fair-minded jury could properly convict if there were to be a trial which included the fresh evidence. Bearing in mind that we must form our own view as to what section 133 means, can the wording of that section on a correct understanding of article 14(6) include either or both of these categories?
100. I have put the words “fresh evidence”, which of course echo the wording of section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (see also section 106(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995), into inverted commas because they depart from the words of section 133. The statute, like article 14(6), refers to a new, or newly discovered “fact”, not to fresh evidence. And it must be a fact which shows beyond reasonable doubt, or “conclusively”, that there was a miscarriage of justice. Fresh evidence does not attain that status until the matter to which it relates has been proved or has been admitted to be true. Fresh evidence that justifies the conclusion referred to in category 3 will usually not be, and certainly need not be, of that character. If it shows that the conviction is merely unsafe, the court may order a retrial. Under our system of trial by jury there will be no way of knowing, beyond reasonable doubt, whether it was a new or newly discovered fact that led to the acquittal. For these reasons I would exclude category 3 from the scope of section 133.
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2010-0046-judgment.pdf