Goncalo Amaral.

[Brietta]

No.  there were two in the 1970s.  Did you not know that?

It was the period during which the Old Guard reinvented themselves and then snuck back into power.

I think there are few who better portray the Old Guard and their sense of entitlement than Amaral and his bezzie mate, Cristovao.

Both of whom were up to the neck in portraying Madeleine's parents as being responsible for her disappearance in one way or another.

[G-Unit]

No.  there were two in the 1970s.  Did you not know that?

It was the period during which the Old Guard reinvented themselves and then snuck back into power.

Only the Carnation Revolution is recorded.

[Eleanor]

I think there are few who better portray the Old Guard and their sense of entitlement than Amaral and his bezzie mate, Cristovao.

Both of whom were up to the neck in portraying Madeleine's parents as being responsible for her disappearance in one way or another.

These two were both educated before The Revolutions.  It might be sad to say that both of them grew up as thugs.

Cristovao is now in prison.  I no longer care about what they do to Amaral The Liar.

[Eleanor]

Only the Carnation Revolution is recorded.

Then you are seriously ill informed.  As usual.

[G-Unit]

Then you are seriously ill informed.  As usual.

"Since the Revolution of the Carnations on April 25, 1974, Portugal has had a democratic republic."
https://www.britannica.com/place/Portugal/Government-and-society#ref896987

I look forward to your cite informing me about this other revolution you refer to.

[Brietta]

"Since the Revolution of the Carnations on April 25, 1974, Portugal has had a democratic republic."
https://www.britannica.com/place/Portugal/Government-and-society#ref896987

I look forward to your cite informing me about this other revolution you refer to.

See if you can find it in here: it didn't happen overnight in 1974 there was unrest for a far longer period.  If Eleanor was living there at the time - I think she will remember it well.

Over forty years of dictatorship had left a vacuum of organisations. Workers’ commissions (comissões de trabalhadores) and residents’ commissions (comissões de moradores) emerged to occupy the vacuum. Residents’ commissions represented the occupation movements which started in Porto and quickly spread to Lisbon and other cities. Workers occupied factories, farms and shipyards. Some of these could not really be considered occupations simply because the owners had abandoned their properties and fled to Brazil. However, Varela stresses that the occupations were about workers’ self-management and not workers’ control. She quotes a worker from Lisnave Margueira shipyard: ‘There will not be workers’ control if we merely intend to run the bosses’ businesses’ (p.144). The occupations and workers’ self-management rose awareness among workers of the importance of taking over political power. The Portuguese was the last revolution in Europe, and maybe in the world, to call into question the private ownership of the means of production.

Defeat of the revolution
So, what went wrong? Using the Russian Revolution as a metaphor, why didn’t February metamorphose into October? Why was the April 1974 revolution defeated in November 1975? Varela discusses some factors that contributed to the defeat and lays a large part of the responsibility on the broad shoulders of the Communist Party (PCP). In an attempt to contain the widespread political activity from below, the pro-Soviet Communist Party was invited to take part in the First Provisional Government in May 1974 and took part in all the six provisional governments thereafter.

The Communist Party was ‘the only force that effectively resisted fascism’ (p .45) and paid a heavy price with many members in prison. In April 1974, the party had no more than three thousand militants. A year later it had grown to 100,000. The Communist Party shared the Soviet cold-war view of the world as one of peaceful co-existence. Supporting this policy was the idea that the division of the world between the socialist and capitalist bloc should be respected. The strategy of the PCP was to win rights for the workers, not to seize political power.

Revolutions will always reach a point when the issue of power comes to the forefront. By the summer of ’75 the country had become increasingly divided. The Socialist Party knew that the favourable outcomes in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly and in the trade unions were not enough to defeat the workers’ control movement which had spread since February. A clear alliance was formed with the Church, the upper hierarchy of the armed forces and the moderates in the MFA, known as the Group of Nine.

On 25th November, the Group of Nine moved against a group of left-wing soldiers organised in the Soldados Unidos Vencerão (Soldiers United for Victory or SUV). The SUV was a rank and file organisation that aimed to prepare the ‘conditions that would permit the destruction of the bourgeois Army and the creation of the armed wing, the Power of Workers, a People’s Revolutionary Army’ (p.225).

Previously, the fear was of a Chileanization of the Portuguese Revolution. The fear was that the counter revolution would be inspired by fascism and would come from outside the MFA, and not from those who had supported the 25th April. The workers and soldiers were not prepared for a social-democratic counter revolution. Too much trust was put on the officers of the MFA and ‘no real structure of organisation of the rank and file existed able to lead at the testing time’ (p.245).

The need for revolutionary organisation
There was resistance against the coup and in support of the soldiers, mainly by groups of building workers who used walkie-talkies, and commandeered enormous earth-movers and concrete-mixers, in order to block the advance of commandos of the Group of Nine who were on the road to arrest members of the SUV. The problem of the 25th November was that there was not a centralised command that organised the resistance, and neither the unions nor the workers’ commissions, controlled by the PCP, were interested in resisting.

The fact that the Communist Party agreed not to resist the move against the SUV weighs heavily on their shoulders. The Socialist Party and the Church initially did not want the Communists in the government, but sectors of the military knew of the strength and influence of the Party among the soldiers and demanded it:

‘The Portuguese Communist Party was prepared to abandon its radical army supporters (and a great many others) in exchange for a continued stake in government. The military left had become a burden on the Communist Party because its performance undermined the balance of power with the Nine and peaceful coexistence agreements between the USA, Western Europe and the USSR. Some 200 soldiers and officers, plus a handful of building workers, were arrested’ (p.246).

Forty-five years after the Revolution its memory is in dispute. The Socialist Party and the establishment will try to portray it ‘as a long process of extending democracy, of the accumulation of forces and rights and the convincing of or neutralisation of social enemies’ (p.254). Representative democracy is thus shown as the destination of the revolution. According to Varela, by contrast, representative democracy defeated direct democracy. In her book launch in the Marx Memorial Library in London, Varela described the Portuguese ruling class as being forced to give their rings so as not to lose their fingers.

This 25th April should be celebrated and remembered as a moment when the working class attempted to seize power and show the world that an alternative is possible.

https://www.counterfire.org/articles/book-reviews/20282-a-people-s-history-of-the-portuguese-revolution-book-review

[G-Unit]

See if you can find it in here: it didn't happen overnight in 1974 there was unrest for a far longer period.  If Eleanor was living there at the time - I think she will remember it well.

Over forty years of dictatorship had left a vacuum of organisations. Workers’ commissions (comissões de trabalhadores) and residents’ commissions (comissões de moradores) emerged to occupy the vacuum. Residents’ commissions represented the occupation movements which started in Porto and quickly spread to Lisbon and other cities. Workers occupied factories, farms and shipyards. Some of these could not really be considered occupations simply because the owners had abandoned their properties and fled to Brazil. However, Varela stresses that the occupations were about workers’ self-management and not workers’ control. She quotes a worker from Lisnave Margueira shipyard: ‘There will not be workers’ control if we merely intend to run the bosses’ businesses’ (p.144). The occupations and workers’ self-management rose awareness among workers of the importance of taking over political power. The Portuguese was the last revolution in Europe, and maybe in the world, to call into question the private ownership of the means of production.

Defeat of the revolution
So, what went wrong? Using the Russian Revolution as a metaphor, why didn’t February metamorphose into October? Why was the April 1974 revolution defeated in November 1975? Varela discusses some factors that contributed to the defeat and lays a large part of the responsibility on the broad shoulders of the Communist Party (PCP). In an attempt to contain the widespread political activity from below, the pro-Soviet Communist Party was invited to take part in the First Provisional Government in May 1974 and took part in all the six provisional governments thereafter.

The Communist Party was ‘the only force that effectively resisted fascism’ (p .45) and paid a heavy price with many members in prison. In April 1974, the party had no more than three thousand militants. A year later it had grown to 100,000. The Communist Party shared the Soviet cold-war view of the world as one of peaceful co-existence. Supporting this policy was the idea that the division of the world between the socialist and capitalist bloc should be respected. The strategy of the PCP was to win rights for the workers, not to seize political power.

Revolutions will always reach a point when the issue of power comes to the forefront. By the summer of ’75 the country had become increasingly divided. The Socialist Party knew that the favourable outcomes in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly and in the trade unions were not enough to defeat the workers’ control movement which had spread since February. A clear alliance was formed with the Church, the upper hierarchy of the armed forces and the moderates in the MFA, known as the Group of Nine.

On 25th November, the Group of Nine moved against a group of left-wing soldiers organised in the Soldados Unidos Vencerão (Soldiers United for Victory or SUV). The SUV was a rank and file organisation that aimed to prepare the ‘conditions that would permit the destruction of the bourgeois Army and the creation of the armed wing, the Power of Workers, a People’s Revolutionary Army’ (p.225).

Previously, the fear was of a Chileanization of the Portuguese Revolution. The fear was that the counter revolution would be inspired by fascism and would come from outside the MFA, and not from those who had supported the 25th April. The workers and soldiers were not prepared for a social-democratic counter revolution. Too much trust was put on the officers of the MFA and ‘no real structure of organisation of the rank and file existed able to lead at the testing time’ (p.245).

The need for revolutionary organisation
There was resistance against the coup and in support of the soldiers, mainly by groups of building workers who used walkie-talkies, and commandeered enormous earth-movers and concrete-mixers, in order to block the advance of commandos of the Group of Nine who were on the road to arrest members of the SUV. The problem of the 25th November was that there was not a centralised command that organised the resistance, and neither the unions nor the workers’ commissions, controlled by the PCP, were interested in resisting.

The fact that the Communist Party agreed not to resist the move against the SUV weighs heavily on their shoulders. The Socialist Party and the Church initially did not want the Communists in the government, but sectors of the military knew of the strength and influence of the Party among the soldiers and demanded it:

‘The Portuguese Communist Party was prepared to abandon its radical army supporters (and a great many others) in exchange for a continued stake in government. The military left had become a burden on the Communist Party because its performance undermined the balance of power with the Nine and peaceful coexistence agreements between the USA, Western Europe and the USSR. Some 200 soldiers and officers, plus a handful of building workers, were arrested’ (p.246).

Forty-five years after the Revolution its memory is in dispute. The Socialist Party and the establishment will try to portray it ‘as a long process of extending democracy, of the accumulation of forces and rights and the convincing of or neutralisation of social enemies’ (p.254). Representative democracy is thus shown as the destination of the revolution. According to Varela, by contrast, representative democracy defeated direct democracy. In her book launch in the Marx Memorial Library in London, Varela described the Portuguese ruling class as being forced to give their rings so as not to lose their fingers.

This 25th April should be celebrated and remembered as a moment when the working class attempted to seize power and show the world that an alternative is possible.

https://www.counterfire.org/articles/book-reviews/20282-a-people-s-history-of-the-portuguese-revolution-book-review

In 1974 a Goverment was overthrown, which is what revolution means. There was then a period of adjustment, but I don't think the skirmishes can be described as another revolution.

[Brietta]

In 1974 a Goverment was overthrown, which is what revolution means. There was then a period of adjustment, but I don't think the skirmishes can be described as another revolution.

There was a counter revolution in 1975.

Advanced layers move ahead of the class
Lacking this, they were engaged in vanguardism. This is a phase that all revolutions go through. The advanced guard feels that the revolution is slipping from their hands and takes action, but isn’t followed by the masses. Like the July Days in 1917 Russia, May Days in Barcelona in 1937. The CP leaders played a treacherous role. At the same time that they were inside the government, until November 1975, they were also outside mobilizing against the government. Their main line was to follow the MFA.

This situation was resolved in the crucial juncture on November 25th. In the middle of huge confusion, the government removed Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the most radical MFA leader, from his commanding position. Confusion ensued among lower ranking officers, the red regiments did not know what to do.
Confusion ensued among lower ranking officers, the red regiments did not know what to do. The more conservative army units were sent against the more radical ones. Some people said that this was a CP-organised takeover. Many people were against the idea of the CP taking over. Workers went to the Fuerte de Almada barracks to get arms, but there were none to be had.

In general, the mass of workers remained passive. The CP was removed from the government and this started a slow and protracted process of counterrevolution in a democratic form.

The regime had emerged after November 25 still called itself a revolutionary government. It could not immediately privatise the banks. It took months to re-establish discipline within military. But they were able to carry out the main task at that time: to take on the left wing elements among the armed forces, arresting many of them. And thus, the movement was left completely without leadership.

The SP supported counterrevolution, and the CP was paralyzed. The strength of the working class required the counterrevolution to be done in a democratic form.

New elections took place in 1976 where Mario Soares, the SP leader, won.

https://www.socialist.net/portugal-1974-75-a-revolution-derailed.htm

[G-Unit]

There was a counter revolution in 1975.

Advanced layers move ahead of the class
Lacking this, they were engaged in vanguardism. This is a phase that all revolutions go through. The advanced guard feels that the revolution is slipping from their hands and takes action, but isn’t followed by the masses. Like the July Days in 1917 Russia, May Days in Barcelona in 1937. The CP leaders played a treacherous role. At the same time that they were inside the government, until November 1975, they were also outside mobilizing against the government. Their main line was to follow the MFA.

This situation was resolved in the crucial juncture on November 25th. In the middle of huge confusion, the government removed Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the most radical MFA leader, from his commanding position. Confusion ensued among lower ranking officers, the red regiments did not know what to do.
Confusion ensued among lower ranking officers, the red regiments did not know what to do. The more conservative army units were sent against the more radical ones. Some people said that this was a CP-organised takeover. Many people were against the idea of the CP taking over. Workers went to the Fuerte de Almada barracks to get arms, but there were none to be had.

In general, the mass of workers remained passive. The CP was removed from the government and this started a slow and protracted process of counterrevolution in a democratic form.

The regime had emerged after November 25 still called itself a revolutionary government. It could not immediately privatise the banks. It took months to re-establish discipline within military. But they were able to carry out the main task at that time: to take on the left wing elements among the armed forces, arresting many of them. And thus, the movement was left completely without leadership.

The SP supported counterrevolution, and the CP was paralyzed. The strength of the working class required the counterrevolution to be done in a democratic form.

New elections took place in 1976 where Mario Soares, the SP leader, won.

https://www.socialist.net/portugal-1974-75-a-revolution-derailed.htm

It isn't recorded as a revolution.

[Venturi Swirl]

It isn't recorded as a revolution.

You’re just being a pedant now.

[Carana]

I do know Portugal a bit, especially during both Revolutions.

But probably more to the point I remember The Michael Cooke Affair when he appeared in Court beaten up and with teeth missing.  The British Government weren't having that happening again.

As well. That case was brought up in Parliament.
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1992/jun/09/mr-michael-cook

However, the Cipriano case might have been fresher in the minds of those in diplomatic circles.

[G-Unit]

You’re just being a pedant now.

Am I, or is it those who claim a revolution occured despite there being no record of it?

[Venturi Swirl]

Am I, or is it those who claim a revolution occured despite there being no record of it?

There are numerous references online to a revolution and a counter revolution in Portugal in the 70s, I respectfully suggest you take it up with them rather than carrying on this history debat here, it’s not really very relevant is it?

[G-Unit]

There are numerous references online to a revolution and a counter revolution in Portugal in the 70s, I respectfully suggest you take it up with them rather than carrying on this history debat here, it’s not really very relevant is it?

It's not relevant at all, but it gets mentioned regularly for some reason.

[Venturi Swirl]

It's not relevant at all, but it gets mentioned regularly for some reason.

Time to move on then I think.