I have noticed a tendency for members to post opinion as fact. In my opinion this is an opinion;
Post #245 http://miscarriageofjustice.co/index.php?topic=8465.240
The mere fact that the SC referred to the McCanns not having demonstrated their innocence is evidence that the scales were not balanced
My first question is did the SC actually say in their 75 page judgement that the McCanns had not demonstrated their innocence? I don't know if they did or not without a cite. More importantly, if those words to appear, why were they included. They may be evidence that the scales were not balanced or they may not. It's not possible to assess the assertion and to reply to it without seeing this 'evidence' and it's context.
From the SC judgement Jan 2017
Page 69
It must be reminded that, in the present case, the issue isn't the appellants' penal liability, in other words their innocence or their guilt concerning the facts leading to the disappearance of her daughter doesn't have to be appreciated here.
What is in discussion here is merely the civil liability of the respondents, on the grounds that they have expressed and disclosed the above-mentioned thesis/opinion on the disappearance in question.
It follows that the outcome of the present case is not such as to call into question the extra-procedural dimension of the presumption of innocence.This means that, even if the action does not proceed, it will not imply, even in the eyes of the community. any consideration of the appellants' liability, because such outcome will never will be able to be equated to an observation of respective culpability (cf. on this topic the judgements Del Latte vs Holland (n°44760/98) of 9/11/2004 and Cheena vs Belgium of 9/5/2016).
In addition, we are faced with a decision of filing by the Public Ministry which is subject to modification through various ways.
Thus, in addition to the recourse to the jurisdictional way, by opening the inquiry (see note p.21) (art. 287° of the CPP) and the complaint to the hierarchical superior (art. 278° of the CPP), the investigation can be reopened if new elements of evidence arise invalidating the grounds called upon by the Public Ministry in the filing dispatch (art. 279° of the CPP).
This is indeed even mentioned in the Note to the Social Communication released by the Attorney General's office on 21/7/2008 and announcing that the filing of the investigation had been decided. It was reported that it could be reopened on the initiative of the Public Ministry or at the request of any interested party if new elements of evidence arise triggering serious, pertinent and consequential proceedings (n°14 of the proven facts).
In this way, as the aforementioned filing order is not a judicial decision stricto senso, nor does it assume a definitive form, less would it be justified invoking the principle of the presumption of innocence to restrain freedom of expression.And the safeguarding of the authority of the judicial power (cf. article 10°-2 of the European Convention on Human Rights) is not alluded to, since is definitely outdated the traditional idea that criticism against the judicial power must be proscribed as it contributes to the undermining of its dignity, authority and credibility in the long term. The best guarantee of dignity of all State institutions in the long run consists in its permanent opening to public criticism.
Page 70
...(cf. Jónatas Machado, Freedom of Expression - Constitutional Dimensions, op. cit. pp. 566-7)
And let not be said, too, that the appellants were cleared by the order of filing the criminal proceedings.In fact, that dispatch was not proclaimed by virtue of the Public Ministry having gained the conviction that the appellants had not committed any crime (cf. art. 277° of the CPP).
The filing, in this case, was decided because it was not possible for Public Ministry to obtain sufficient evidence of the practice of crimes by the appellants (cf. the cited art. 277°-2)There is, therefore, a remarkable difference, and not merely a semantic one, between the legally admissible grounds of the filing order.Thus, it does not appear acceptable to consider that the alluded dispatch, based on the insufficiency of evidence, should be treated as evidence of innocence.
We consider, therefore, that the invocation of breach of the principle of presumption of innocence should not be upheld. That principle does not fall under the decision about the question that has to be resolved.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IMO the SC contradicts its own reasoning for not breaching the principle of presumption of innocence & the role it played in Amaral's rights.