Sandra Lean is a self publicist, she is also an internet troll who spent years running around websites promoting the Mitchell case to anyone who would listen. One of her best known fictional characters was jigsawman, a name which she used to attack others with impunity on a forum called Fact & Myth. She then went around telling anyone who would listen that she never uses any other user names. You couldn't make it up!
The following were posted by a
Colin Bowman,15th May 2007, here:
http://gerardkeegan.proboards.com/thread/247/luke-mitchell?page=11"The Sandra Lean below has been actively concerned with the Luke Mitchell case since before his conviction.
Her book is very concerned about what passes for circumstantial evidence. In it she deals with the Luke Mitchell case.
I understand her to also have been working cooperatively with the Frontline production team.
A lot of ongoing analysis of the prosecution has continued. This has indicated general weaknesses in its circumstantial argument.
Significant data not led at trial now is known.
Chances of successful legal appeal are very much hampered by the grounds of appeal being allowed.
Overturning of the conviction may well have to be pressed by argument and publicity out-with the legal process.
The 'psychology' which became part of the prosecution, at trial and in public domain, remains of concern.
"No Smoke - The Shocking Truth About British Justice (Paperback)
by Lady Sandra Lean (Author)
Price: £11.99 (Amazon)
Synopsis
A life-long fascination with the workings of the human mind, and especially the workings of the "criminal mind," led Sandra Lean, at the age of 32, through the doors of Napier University in Edinburgh. A single parent of two young children, she studied Psychology and Sociology to Honours Degree level. A Masters' Degree in Forensic Psychology seemed like the most obvious next step, until a local, high-profile murder hit the headlines. Behind the scenes, Sandra Lean began sifting through the facts, only to discover that all was not as it seemed. What she found led her to other, similar cases, and more patient, methodical sifting, in an investigation that was to last almost four years. The result was a shocking, but true, discovery. Innocent people are being locked up in our prisons, convicted of the most horrific crimes, on a regular basis. These are not one-off, tragic mistakes, but rather, a routine, everyday occurrence. For every high-profile miscarriage of justice that we hear about, there are dozens more that never make the news. No Smoke examines just some of these cases, highlighting the very human tragedy of wrongful conviction, and pointing out the unthinkable: this could happen to any one of us."
"Martin covers some of the case weaknesses above. The absence of conventional or traditional 'empirical' 'evidence', goes beyond the lack of DNA and other forensics. There are no (reliable and explicit and corroborated) sightings of Luke Mitchell (as there is also not of Jodi Jones). There is no impact of murdering on Luke Mitchell, and no explanation of how he avoided that, or cleaned up after. There is no proven history of psychological instability or violence. The profiling done of Luke Mitchell is to see him be deemed 'beyond the pale', but not as someone likely to murder. The Black Dahlia parallel is unsubstantiated, as is Luke Mitchell's especial interest in Manson. and so on.
What we do have is a complex 'psychological' argument, that how Luke Mitchell 'presented': in his person and his life-style and its choices; before the murder and after it, and before and at trial: 'circumstantially' indicated that he was indeed the person who Craig Dobbie, the lead police officer, claimed that he was. That psychological argument involved psychological 'experts' (who most generally lent weight to the claim that Luke Mitchell was lying). It involved the testimonies of other witnesses being collated into a net of suggestion, which 'modelled' Luke Mitchell as 'behaving' as would a/the person who had murdered Jodi Jones. One of these experts, Dr Paul Ekman, may well have given critical guidance in designing and planning the whole prosecution against Luke Mitchell.
There are many other items of concern to do with the media. The matter of the Police having lost/destroyed the crime scene forensic data, simply cannot be overstated in terms of its significance.
In terms of 'credibility', the greatest weakness in the prosecution case: is that it critically depended on the testimony of the other three, who with Luke Mitchell, found Jodi's body.
The prosecution argue, and as the central proof of Luke Mitchell's guilt (as stated in Alan Turnbull QC's summing up), that Luke Mitchell 'had to have known where the body was', given how he 'behaved'.
The problem is that this interpretation is based on 'nuances' in Luke Mitchell's presentation. Where these nuances are not consistent with the real-time real-circumstance context. Are not consistent with statements initially given; where these statements instead support Luke Mitchell's defence version. And so on.
But, most critically, these other three are 'members' of an extended family, who in 'fingering' Luke Mitchell, 'exonerate' members of their own family; where the data available much more implicates these members as suspects for the murder, than it does implicate Luke Mitchell.
That 'ulterior' agenda on the part of these witnesses, then has to be correlated with a consideration of Craig Dobbie the lead investigation officer: who has not only overseen the loss of crime scene data, but has almost immediately settled on Luke Mitchell as the murderer of Jodi.
The defence would then argue that two things follow: firstly, that the investigation acts to exonerate other suspects, in order to pursue Luke Mitchell as the sole suspect; secondly, that witnesses are subject to, and yield to a powerful 'demand effect' which is introduced by the nature of police investigation. The defence claim then has to become that the police created/fabricated/massaged what emerged as witness-testimony at trial and in public domain: such that that this data from investigation has to be considered an epiphenomenon of its method and implementation.
The above is really the central matter; namely that the police investigation generated fundamentally unreliable 'findings'. But these findings were then fed into a social process. And its there that the Luke Mitchell story really begins.
My judgement is, that psychological experts who became drawn into this phase, are on thin ice. That tabloid journalists were, although equally consequential, we can anticipate.
Essentially, what circumstantial data the police investigation had generated as 'findings', was then fed into social and public domain processes. The defence argument then is, that everything which then followed (including media reporting and action of educational authorities) was 'prejudicial' to Luke Mitchell, and his prospect of fair trial and defence in it. I would go further and argue that much of the formal and informal prosecution of Luke Mitchell, at trial and in public domain, was nothing other than a prejudice phenomenon: such that Luke Mitchell ended condemned and convicted on a ground of prejudice, and not in any way on a basis of evidence as responsibly understood. What evidence there was, that weighed in the balances of judicial judgement, was not distinguishable from prejudice.
There are then more complex considerations to do with (what was then a novel) operational collusion between: investigating police, prosecution agents, the fiscal, educational authorities, probably religious and political authorities.
Again, Alan Turnbull QC had utilised the same methods he used in prosecuting Luke Mitchell, in gaining conviction of Megrahi in the PanAm case (and other cases such as the Nat Fraser case). There is concerning indication that Turnbull (now judicially elevated, and therefore involved in any appeal process) was able and willing to gain 'convenient convictions', where it had appeared that there was no evidential basis for such conviction.
The broadest judgement is that these Turnbull convictions are generally unsafe, and merely socially or politically advantageous; their grounding circumstantial 'evidence' being spurious and without safe foundation. It may also be the case, that in these instances, the investigating police are at risk of being drawn into what some could see as 'irregularities': appeals against Turnbull led convictions, certainly involve that suggestion.
There is then a complex but central matter that I would centre on the person of Donald Findlay, and in his role as defence agent.
The concern would go like this: defence argument is often necessarily so complex, in order to countervail prosecution argument; that these defence arguments end being inaccessible to juries and public.
In the recent Tobin case, the defence by Findlay (et al) was simply brilliant; comprehensively challenging all prosecution items, and in manner in would have been hard to anticipate. Yet the jury took only four hours to convict Tobin; such that it is hard to conclude that they fully considered the arguments led in defence.
Defence would appear fundamentally undermined by such a circumstance, of jury and peers not much registering perspectives and arguments necessary for defence.
In such instances, where psychology supporting rational cognizance falters, any void is going to be filled by prejudice; a prejudice more open to manipulation by prosecution than defence.
The solution might seem to be 'education'. But there we encounter a problem. The education which would allow others to see what Findlay can 'see', is not much supported in what is currently transpiring for our society. While, in both formal education, and in the informal education of culture, what more readily supports prosecution argument and process, is being much sponsored.
While far from impotent, the intellectual and cultural traditions which Findlay represents, and does so as defence lawyer, can be considered as on the back foot.
And all that is part of the absence of safety in Luke Mitchell's conviction; which makes it a matter of interest to psychology.
The strictly psychological aspect of this, perhaps concerns the processes which have made all this possible.
Indicated research might deal with how prejudice and legal process can intermingle; and what safeguards we might have in that intermingling.
18 May 2007
"What I know of the trial process did not see the defence adequately 'attack' the expert witnesses on the psychological and profiling side.
The defence did technically deal adequately with the 'black dahlia' parallel: but the psychological arguments that were integral to the prosecution argument, I do not think were adequately challenged. There may have been good reason for that: namely that the prosecution vision of Luke Mitchell was dripping with psychological modelling, but that modelling was very diffuse; and that modelling had an unclear division, between what was coming out in the media, and what was led as 'expert' testimony at trial. It may be the case that most of the psychological argument in the prosecution, was embedded and somewhat implicit, and not formally explicated by any expert.
I think that all this then bears on two areas of defence complaint: firstly, that they as defence feel they were not properly made aware of the nature of the case which the prosecution were going to lead; secondly, that the judge should have moved more strongly on matters of admissibility.
With hindsight, I consider that the prosecution arguments concerning psychological suggestions about Luke Mitchell and his family, should be ruled inadmissible: because they were so diffuse, and because they were not formally led by an 'expert' who could have been challenged.
Again with hindsight, it can be seen, that had the prosecution laid out every psychological suggestion about Luke Mitchell, formally and comprehensively as you might in any academic paper: then such psychological reasoning would have been admissible; simple because their would then have been some author responsible for such suggestion, where the defence could have then challenged that reasoning just as it would be challenged within a discipline of origin.
I think that such a demand is reasonable in this case, because it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the prosecution circumstantial argument ended so comprehensively dependent on a psychological profiling of Luke Mitchell.
That having been said, and seeking to do a 'reverse engineering' trawl of the prosecution case, to see what psychological suggesting about Luke Mitchell they did rely on; proves fundamentally difficult, if not impossible.
My personal conclusion then is, that this difficulty arises because the prosecution vision of Luke Mitchell is, in fact, prejudice: that is, it is an instance and action of prejudice; although it presents as an intersecting set of psychological suggestions.
Prejudice and psychological profiling differ. Psychological profiling should exhibit all the qualities of academic psychology: it should be clearly definable, its claims and assumptions should be transparent, it should be open to critical scrutiny on a peer-agreed basis. Prejudice is different: intending an existential outcome for another person; and having a massive redundancy to see this outcome existentially guaranteed.
I'm not too knowledgeable, either on appeal process, or on what follows from this or that appeal outcome.
I've never felt that formal legal appeal was going to bring Luke Mitchell much if any relief.
That relief, if it comes, I judge will come from public domain discrediting of the original processes, of trial and police investigation.
I've spent two or three years going through what data there is on this whole affair.
As you indicate, the weaknesses of investigation and trial processes are legion, and ever grow with fresh analysis: but, and a massive but, these proven weaknesses don't see the hydra killed.
There is another level to the human processes and perceived logic in this case, and they somewhat defy objective critique: and that again leaves me judging that we here deal with a 'prejudice' phenomenon, which must be addressed as such; where something stemming from that address must then feed back into the public domain, and as advocacy that this trial and conviction are fundamentally unsafe. Advocates for Luke Mitchell's release from conviction have to persuade the public that the police investigation, and the process of trial, were instances of, and perhaps little more than prejudice directed at Luke Mitchell.
My personal problem is that I'm still struggling to achieve the methodology for this.
19th May 2007
"I reckon its a matter of moving towards a conceptualisation and modelling of prejudice; where a basis for its auditing in the context of legal process, can be considered.
All fundamentally difficult as you sketch out. Perhaps more necessary and required, than it is immediately possible.
What this Luke Mitchell case seems to indicate, is: that as general social developments see method in prosecution altered and developed, such that previous checks and balances have less force; then a controversial level of prejudice can end perceived as effecting conviction outcome. So maybe we have to continue exploring that perception; leaving the push onto challenging what is seen as driving such prejudice, to a later and subsequent moment. So the initial consideration of prejudice remains an in-house affair for the advocacy forum: where it has impact because done in the public domain; but does not begin with the force to much directly affect what is seen as prejudice and prejudiced.
Often what sees such impact increase, is the coherence of a position: people can come over to that position; where it is that, rather than a direct assault on the power of what the position addresses, which eventually sees the balance of things changed.
"Given that Paul Ekman (and he working out of psychological perspective which is at least contiguous with the 'evolutionary' approach) was an exceedingly important player in these Luke Mitchell centred events, and that you here bring forward a 'claim' grounded in a particular and alternate psychological perspective: we would seem to have opportunity to reflect on how perspectives crafted and regulated within academic psychology; can break out and have influence on real world events.
Psychological claim permeated the prosecution circumstantial case against Luke Mitchell.
Yet that same body of psychological claim was not subject to academically rigorous scrutiny.
Far from being so scrutinised, the defence seems not to have properly anticipated it, nor thereby prepared for its rebuttal.
The psychological claims about Luke Mitchell were not formally explicit and necessarily unified. They were not presented under the protocols met in an academic paper. They were diffuse and suggestive: in the wind of things; never really wholly there to be explicitly and comprehensively challenged.
My sense at the time, was that this left a lacuna, where the institution of psychology might have moved to rectify matters.
Justification would be on two counts. Firstly, that 'products' of that institution were in use. Secondly, that this institution was best placed to handle the complex mix of suggestion and claim, as to things psychological.
I was somewhat shocked that nothing happened on this front. The media can bear some responsibility here. They seeming to seek out only human sciences practitioners who were confirming the prosecution and conviction.
But, it was still open to the institution of psychology, to in some manner lodge a concern in public domain. A concern subsisting in a sense that while psychology had been exploited in the prosecution, not all the psychology that should have been brought to bear, then had been.
You note above that 'cognitive' psychology would have it that Granny Jones would remember what she wore when finding Jodi's body.
That then becomes something of a crux of things.
Wheel this psychological perspective into play, and the empirical you suggest, then putatively holds.
Wheel it away, and that empirical recedes.
Psychology itself, and perhaps nothing else, can take us beyond the binary of the empirical observation stemming from the perspective. Hold to that perspective as your epistemological assumption, identify with it as your prejudice: and its empirical holds. Withdraw those conditions, and that empirical tends to failure.
Such consideration holds for all the perspectives in psychology. Assume them, identify with them, and their data are generated, their empirical holds.
Withdraw from such commitment, and that empirical fails.
That would seem to lead to some basis on which psychology should and should-not take part in legal process.
Namely, there should be no such (expert) psychology, or there should be all-psychology. The basis of apparent validity should be laid bare: perceived data following from assumed perspective; such data falling as assumption is withdrawn.
The interaction between 'common sense' (public domain understanding) and formal psychology, certainly in a court of law and within legal process, is a highly sensitive one.
One difficulty stemming from this Luke Mitchell case, and associated with what is now involved in mounting proper legal defence: is that such defence may be forced to discredit psychology itself, rather as the Mckie case forced defence to discredit the finger-printing services